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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
ROCK--OLA MANUFACTURING
CORP.,

Plaintiff
Case No.
9266

vs.

DAN STEW_A.RT COMPANY,
INC., and O_A.N STEWART,

Defendants

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ST~A.TEMENT

OF FACT

This is an action filed by Plaintiff to recover $9,068.28,
with interest on a contract for certain commercial phono-graph machines.
By stipulation Defendants admitted the owing of the
debt, but allege by way of counterclaim, that Plaintiff and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendants entered into a written agreement (Exhibit 1.. )
which was breached by Plaintiff to Defendants' damage in
the sum of $50,000.00.
Defendants were prepared to prove the damages on the
counterclaim when Plaintiff made a motion for summary
judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that Plaintiff is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, based on he files and records
herein and the deposition of Dan B. Stewart.
The motion was argued, submitted and briefs supplied
by both sides. Thereafter, the Court granted the motion
and dismissed Defendants' counterclaim. It is from this
summary judgment that this appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The Court erred in granting Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment.
2. The Court erred in entering its judgment and order
dismussing Defendants' counterclaim. {Tr. 35)
POINTS TO BE ARGUED
1. It is the position of Defendants that the agreement
entered into created an exclusive distributors' agreement,
which was breached by Plaintiff's permitting others to sell
its product in the area therein defined. (Exh. 1)
2. It is further the position of Defendants that the
ruling of the trial Court enforces the agreement without
mutuality; that the condition therein binding upon De..
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fendants was by said ruling not binding upon Plaintiff,
and therefore lacking in mutuality.
ARGUMENT
We must consider in this case whether or not the con-tract (Exhibit 1) was an exclusive distributors agreement.
As will appear from the other agreements of previous years
(Exhibit 2), the word "exclusive" was used but was de-leted by this year's agreement.
It is our position that the agreement itself (Exhibit 1)
created an exclusive distributors agreement, by the fol-lowing: (a) the territory in which Stewart might sell is
defined. (b) Stewart's guarantee to purchase 96 machines
during the year as set forth in par. 5. (c) Stewart's agree-ment to follow policies and practices relative to prices and
delivery of sales as prepared by Rock--Ola in paragraph 14;
(d) Stewart's promise that he will "not sell, solicit or
receive orders for any products manufactured by any com-pany other than Rock--Ola, which competes with Rock-Ola Equipment, whether current year or prior year equip-ment" - par. 22.
"Whether or not a principal who has contracted to
pay an agent compensation if the agent is successful in
accomplishing a definite result promises that he will not
compete with the agent, either personally or through an-other agent, depends upon the manifestation of the parties
interpreted in light of the circumstances to which the
manifestations are made." Restatement of the Law Agency
~449.

In 126 i-\LR 1225 Navy Gas & Supply Co. vs. A. A.
Schoench, Colo.--98 P.2nd 860 ( 1940) at p. 1229. Under
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date of the contract, by letter Defendant advised Plaintiff:
''As a means of clarification the tank wagon area of
Golden, Colo., is defined as follows: Jefferson County
with the exception of the S. W. comer which is now being
served by the Morrison Auto Supply Co. This will clarify
the situation to such an extent that there will be no mis-understanding as to the area you are to serve." By this
language of limitation the amendment clearly imports that
the Plaintiff should not be allowed to sell Defendants'
products outside the sharply defined area indicated and
implies exclusiveness therein. Upon the principle approved
by us in Baird vs. Baird, 48 Colo. 506, Ill P. 79 Hinkle
vs. Blinn, 92 Colo. 302, 19 P. 2nd 1038, and other similar
cases, that the practical interpretation given to the con-tract by the parties while engaged in its performance and
before any controversy has arisen is one of the best indi..
cations of their true intent, the Plaintiff, as demonstrative
of the exclusive agency construction, introduced evidence
to the effect that previously upon at least six occasions
he was paid commission by Defendant upon sales made
directly to it to construction contractors and to govern-mental agencies in Plaintiff's territory.
Under the terms of the agency agreement, vie\ved in the
light of the surrounding circumstances, as well as the man-ner of its interpretation by the parties, we are of the
opinion that the trial Court did not err in instructing the
Jury as it did on the legal effect of the conract. The fact
that it provides that the commissions were to be paid upon
such products as are sold by second party and on gasoline
and kerosene delivered by him, is not compatible with the
exclusive agency interpretation, since if that construction
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is accorded, no one other than Plaintiff had authority to
sell or deliver Defendants' products in the area. In the
case before us Plaintiff was precluded from doing these
things by the assumption of this authority by Defendant.
It is well settled that the grant of an "exclusive" agency
to sell, i.e. exclusive right to sell the products of a whole..sale dealer in a specified territory ordinarily is interpreted
as precluding competition by the principal in any form
within the area.
The Court held in White Co. vs. Farley & Co., 219
Ky. 66, 292 SW 472 . .52, ALR 541..-1927: "A sales agency
contract which assigns the agent certain territory, outside
of which he is not allowed to operate in the sale of the
principal's motor cars, which requires him to handle no
cars or parts, except those manufactured by the principal,
and which allows the agent a bonus commission depending
upon the amount of his total cash sales, confers an ex . .
elusive agency, although it does not specifically so pro..vide." The contract appears to have been prepared by
appellant, and does not specifically provide that it is an
exclusive contract. Its provisions, as a whole however, are
inconsistent with any other view. It not only definitely fixes
the area in which appellee is authorized to sell its trucks,
but the agent is expressly required not to sell any of Ap . .
pellant's trucks outside of or to be sold outside of the
designated territory, and provides that if the agent violates
this provision, the company may immediately cancel the
contract. It requires the agent to handle no other com..mercial motor cars except those manufactured by appel . .
lant, and to handle no parts for White Commercial Motor
cars, except those manufactured by appellant. It further
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provides for the allowance to the agent for an additional
discount called a bonus commission, based upon the net
amount paid on or before the expiration of the contract,
the amount of the bonus commission depending upon the
total cash sales during the existence of the contract; and
that additional discount is based partially "upon the price
the purchaser would have paid hereunder for all standard
models of new commercial car chassis above enumerated
delivered by the White Company and used in the territory
in which the purchaser (agent) hereunder sells White
Commercial Motor cars.
Clearly, under these provisions the contract was, in..
tended to be and was considered by the parties, as ex.clusive agency during its term, and there is no contention
in appellant's brief that it was otherwise, it being virtually
conceded that appellant, during the life of the conract had
no right to invade that territory and sell its trucks so as
to deprive appellee of his contract commission."
In the present case we therefore take the position that
the contract gave to Stewart an exclusive distributorship.
The other agreements for previous years, introduced and
received at the pre. . trial, used the word "Exclusive" dis.tributor. The word "exclusive" was deleted from the 1959
contract. However, the 1959 distributor's agreement was
and is by its terms an exclusive agreement even though
the word "exclusive" has been deleted.
The deposition of Dan Stewart shows in 1959 Rock.-Ola
sold machines to B & G Sales, a competitor of Stewart, and
that although the machines were shipped to Uni.-Con in
Wichita, Kansas, they were immediately sent to B & G
sales in Salt Lake City and financed by Rock. .Ola (Stewart's
6
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Deposition p. 6). Based on recorded chattel mortgages we
were prepared to show that the machines sold in this man. .
ner were new machines. This conduct continued all
through the year, 1958. Our evidence would have shown,
had we been permitted to go on trial, that on several occa. .
sions Stewart complained and Plaintiff's representatives
promised to look into the matter and stop the B & G sales.
Uni Con was a disributor working out of Wichita,
Kansas and was selling in Stewart's territory with financ . .
ing help from Plaintiff.
This practice continued into 1959 and on January 29,
1959, Mr. Stewart wrote a letter informing Plaintiff that
he was being seriously handicapped in carrying out the
provisions of his agreement relative to a certain quota of
sales. {Stewart Deposition p. 7. .8)
Thereafter, Plaintiff not only failed to stop the Uni. .
Con Sales to B & G but financed them. Further, Plaintiff
failed to ship the machines after Defendants sent in sales
orders. Defendants were required to purchase machines
to fill orders from B & G Sales at their price.
We were prepared to show further that on July 1st,
1959, Mr. Stewart was informed by a letter which he
finally received July 7th, 1959, that "because of your failure
to maintain said quota for each of said two quarterly
periods, and to purchase at least said number of phono . .
graphs and said amount of accessories, during each of said
two quarterly periods, (provided in paragraph 5 of Dis . .
tributor's Agreement, Exh. 1) the undersigned Rock . .Ola
Mfg. Corp. pursuant to Par. 6 of said Distributor's Agree . .
ment will, 15 days from date hereof terminate said Dealer's
Agreement." (Dan Stewart Dep. p. 21)
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Mr. Stewart further testified that at the time of the
termination he had in excess of $6,000.00 in parts for the
machines, (Stewart Dep. p. 18) and that he lost $6,000.00
or $7,000.00 in sales because he was unable to deliver the
machines.
Mr. R. }. Baker, in his deposition (p. 7) testified that
the machines which he purchased were financed through
Rock--Ola and that payments were made directly to Rock
Ole from B & G Sales in Salt Lake City.
Mr. Stewart in his depositon also testified that Rock..
Ola financed the machines for B & G (16 Stewart Dep.)
We will show from the serial numbers that the rna..
chines sold by B & G Sales were new current models. Some
of these machines were routed through Uni--Con in Wi..
chita, while some of them were shipped directly to Salt
Lake City from Rock--Ola. Stewart purchased one of these
machines and saw the label and serial numbers on the other
(Stewart Dep. p. 11--12)
Plaintiff in this case does not appear before this Court
asking relief with clean hands. Plaintiff has deliberately
misled Defendant on its past transactions and has gone
out of its way to put Stewart out of business. Mr. Stewart
testifed (Dep. p. 23) that: "when you receive a distributor-ship from a factory like Rock--Ola that you have the terri-tory allotted to you and they will work with you and
protect you every way they can, and keep other people
from infringing on your territory; and that is the oral
part of it.

Q.
stood?

You say it is understood; now how is it under.-
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A. Well that is a practice of the business. For in-stance, all customers - if they want Rock--Ola Services they come to the distributor, that is the disributor for
Rock . .Ola to get it. If they want Seeburg service, they go to
a Seeburg Distributor to get it."
We come now to the further consideration of the lack
of mutuality contained in the agreement (Exhibit 1).

2 Am. Jur. 44 Sec. 4 7: Whether or not a party to an
agency may recover damages for a breach of contract
based upon the wrongful termination of the agency de-pends, of course, on whether there is a valid obligation
of such nature existing between the parties, which question
in turn depends in some cases on whether there is any
mutuality of obligation between the parties.

Hutchings vs. Stevenson 148 ALR 1320, 141 Tex,
448--178 sw 2d 487.

Naify vs. Pac. Suden Co. 115 ALR 4 76, 11 Cal. 2d 5,
76 Pac. 2d 663.
A contract must have mutuality of obligation, and an
agreement which permits one party to withdraw at his
pleasure is void.

Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Clarbourne .. Rene Co.,
89 ALR 238, 64 Fed. 224: "The rule which requires
mutuality of obligation with respect to contracts to be per. .
formed in the future where the promise of one party con..stitutes the sole consideration for the promise of the other
arises from the inherent unfairness of enforcing a contract
which requires performance by one of the parties while
leaving the other party free to accept or reject performance.
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In Hoffman vs. P/ingston ( 1951) 260 Wic. 160, 50
NW 2nd 360, 26 ALR 2d 1131, the Court held that the
rule that an agreement to supply a buyer according to
the requirements of his business is sufficiently definite as
to quantity to be enforceable is inapplicable to render valid
a contract lacking mutuality because of the absence of a
corresponding duty of the Buyer to order.
THE COURT: ''The named standard being gone we
do not see how Pfingsten could have appealed to another
which the parties had never referred to, either in the
original or in the modified agreement, and this is particu.
larly so where Hoffman had no obligation to give all his
time to "Old Tanner" nor to prosecute its development
vigorously but was permitted by the contract to engage in
another business which did not deal in products similar
to "Old Tanner".
"Our conclusions that the contract as modified lacks
mutuality and is therefore void makes it necessary to con . .
sider propostions that Pfingsten may end it at will because
its duration is indefinite. The argument has much force
and was resolved in Pfingsten's favor by the trial Court,
but the solution is not necessary to our determination."
In the present case there is a duty imposed upon the
Defendants to sell in the territory defined in the contract
(Ex h. 1). There was also a duy on the part of Plaintiff
to perform under the contract.
CONCLUSION
Under the circumstances \Ve submit that Defendants
did have an exclusive distributorship; that Plaintiff's con . .
duct resulted in Defendants' failure to produce under the
10
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contract. Defendants had done business with Plaintiff for
a number of years and had had the exclusive franchise
during that time.
Plaintiff had to this point successfully avoided any
liability under the contract and has caused the loss which
Defendants set forth in their counterclaim, by merely
deleting therefrom the word "Exclusive." (Exh. 1)
Respectfully Submitted,

LAMAR DUNCAN
RONALD C. BARKER
Attorneys for Appellant
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